Prince George Registry No. 6627/85

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

PRINCE GEORGE, B.C.

November 13, 1986

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BETWEEN: MARK SCHNURR

PLAINTIFF

AND:

KEVIN W. LUNDRIGAN

DEFENDANT

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

OF THE HONOURABLE

JUDGE McKINNON, L.J.S.C.

D. BYL, Esq.

THE COURT:

vehicle.

T.V. COLE, Esq.

appearing for the Plaintiff

appearing for the Defendant

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The plaintiff contends that he lost control when it

(Oral) The plaintiff seeks damages sustained in a

The collision occurred about 9:20 A.M. on August 13th,

intersection of Highway 16 and Burrard Street near Vanderhoof,

collision between his bicycle and a pick-up truck at the

1985 when the defendant turned left from Highway 16 north

Highway 16 intending to turn right, lost control of his

bicycle near the intersection and cut through a service

station onto Burrard striking the side of the defendant's

onto Burrard Street, and the plaintiff, who was westbound on

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became apparent to him that if he continued west on Highway 16 and turned onto Burrard in the right turn lane, he would, with certainty, collide with the defendant's truck. He realized a collision was imminent when only about 20 feet from the intersection and was at this time going about 15 miles per hour, far too fast to stop. He took what he felt was the only course open and that was to veer right into the service station, but this, unfortunately, was not successful in avoiding a collision.

The defendant, through interrogatories, admits he never saw the plaintiff or the bicycle until the moment of impact when he saw him at the periphery of his vision, but by this time the collision was inevitable. There was some dispute about the turn made by the defendant, but I am satisfied that the turn which was made was a wide turn into the east or outside lane of Burrard as opposed to the inside or lane closest to the centre line. I accept the plaintiff's evidence that the precise location vis a vis lanes is shown accurately on page five of exibit number one.

There was also some dispute about precisely where the impact took place on Burrard Street. The plaintiff says it was close to Highway 16 about 20 feet north, whereas the defendant and Constable Smith place it between 45 and 75 feet from the intersection. Constable Smith, of course, could only testify as towhere he saw the vehicles after impact. Mr. Lundrigan, the defendant, was equivocal saying at one point in his interrogatories that he was "a few yards from

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the intersection." Then he says he "thinks" the impact was 75 feet from the intersection. I prefer the plaintiff's estimate because it is more in keeping with his route through the station lot. This was so near some posts he was afraid of striking them. A view of the photos indicates this route is very near the intersection.

The only real significance about the point of impact is to place the defendant's vehicle in the outside or curb lane right from its entry into the intersection. The plaintiff argues that notwithstanding any precise legislation prohibiting the type of turn made by the defendant, a review of Section 155(a) of the Motor Vehicle Act is reasonably close. This coupled with one's common sense about such turns is sufficient, he says, to demonstrate that such a turn is wrong and, therefore, negligent in the circumstances.

The theory, as I understand it, is that a person such as the plaintiff is entitled to conclude that the curb lane on Burrard would be free for westbound traffic on Highway 16 to turn left. Indeed, the third lane westbound on Highway 16 is designated by an arrow as a right turn lane. The plaintiff further argues Section 176 of the Motor Vehicle Act, which is the section governing left turns and says that he was so close that he constituted an immediate hazard and the defendant was required to yield to him.

The defendant argues that on the evidence the only person who could have avoided this collision was the plaintiff because he was the only one who observed both parties. It

was the plaintiff who admitted seeing the defendant a hundred feet from the intersection and seeing him shortly thereafter start his turn. Notwithstanding this observation, he continued at a good speed of 15 miles per hour confident that he could make the turn without difficulty. Only when he got near, did he conclude the turn could not be made, but then he opted to turn right into the service station where he lost control.

Mr. Cole argues that Mr. Lundrigan, by Section 176, is only obliged to ensure there is no through traffic before turning, which he did; therefore, he was not offending any statutory duty. He further points to the plaintiff's own admission that he often observed vehicles make such a wide turn, thus, he says the plaintiff approached the intersection at a speed far in excess of that of a prudent man armed with this knowledge. I must say at first blush this has a nice ring to it, but on reflection, what Mr. Cole is saying is that if one does not bother to keep a sharp look-out, one can be excused and the blame placed entirely on the other party who admits to seeing events. It is reminiscent of the old last chance doctrine.

I have been unable to extract any precise statutory duty upon the defendant to enter Burrard in the lane closest to the centre line, but this is surely the prudent route to follow. It is also, in my view, strongly suggested by various sections of the Motor Vehicle Act and, particularly, Section 167(2)(c). The defendant's admitted failure to

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observe the plaintiff cyclist at all and his wide left turn into a lane clearly marked for traffic in the plaintiff's lane renders him negligent. In making this finding I do not conclude that there is a statutory duty upon the defendant to enter Burrard in the lane closest to the centre line. I merely say that on these facts, the failure of the defendant to see the plaintiff and his ultimate use of the right turn lane, which was in use and properly so by the plaintiff, is negligence.

I am also of the view that the plaintiff contributed to the collision. I was impressed with his candid responses. He admitted a fairly high rate of speed coming down the hill, which was clocked by Constable Smith on radar at 38 kilometres per hour. He admitted to a speed of perhaps 15 miles per hour with 20 feet of the intersection, even though he saw the defendant commence a turn much before and within a period of time when he could quite easily have stopped. He was aware that vehicles often turn wide at this particular intersection, and although he could not recall the conversation with Constable Smith, I am satisfied that he was in a hurry at the time and did not take the care he should have. In my view, the plaintiff approached the intersection at a speed much faster than he should have given the circumstances. I fix the contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff at 20 per cent.

The plaintiff was disoriented following the collision.

He says he was unconscious, although the medical reports filed

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as Exhibits 3 and 4 say he was not unconscious. In any event, he suffered some disorientation, abrasions, lacerations with stitches to the forehead and a sore neck. He was hospitalized some thirty hours, off work four days and substantially recovered within three weeks. His residual complaints are a scar one and a quarter to one and a half inches long which troubles him. He does not consider this a badge of honour. He is bothered by it and intends to seek plastic surgery in the future to remove as much of it as possible. The other residual complaint is a sore neck on those occasions when he engages in strenuous activity such as wood chopping, crosscountry skiing or playing a game known as survival. He took medication for this at first, but now does not as it did not assist. This pain is invariably gone after a night's sleep. In the result, we have a 22 year old man who sustained painful abrasions and lacerations, but whose condition apart from the residual problems resolved within three weeks of the collision. The medical report filed as Exhibit 4 suggests the neck pain, at least, will resolve in time.

Plaintiff's counsel referred me to Chisholm versus

I.C.B.C., Vancouver Registry number V841462; Nedokus versus

Pouliot et al, Nanaimo Registry CC5953; and Ainscough versus

Walton, Vancouver Registry B820613; and Jones versus

Armstrong, Victoria Registry number 843/1980 in support of

his claim for damages in the range of eight to ten thousand

dollars.

Defendant's counsel referred me to Teneycke versus

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Kringhaug, Nelson Registry SC401-1983; Taylor versus Lenfesty et al, Vancouver Registry number B940337 in support of his contention that any award should be much more modest.

The plaintiff was a very credible witness. He answered questions without hesitation and sometimes to his detriment. He did not maximize his injuries, rather he simply described them in a straightforward way. The residual injuries are, of course, the most serious. I believe the neck problem will resolve itself as suggested by the medical reports and perhaps surgery will reduce the noticeable scar, but it is presently quite prominent.

In all of the circumstances, I award general damages of \$7,000.00 plus agreed wage loss of \$160 and agreed specials of \$113.54 for a total of \$7,273.54. This will be reduced by 20 per cent for a net award of \$5,818.83. Costs to the plaintiff.

(SUBMISSIONS BY COUNSEL)

THE COURT: I think I will give the plaintiff his costs in this case, Mr. Cole.