Court of Appeal

ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Before:

The Honourable Chief Justice Nemetz
The Honourable Mr. Justice Hinkson
The Honourable Madam Justice McLachlin

VANCOUVER, B.C.

DECEMBER 18, 1985.

BETWEEN:

INSURANCE CORPORATION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

PLAINTIFF (APPELLANT)

AND:

DARLENE CLEMMENSON

DEFENDANT (RESPONDENT)

R. Bruce Harvey, Esq. Q.C. D. Byl, Esq.

appearing for the Appellant appearing for the Respondent

(On appeal from the judgment of Low, C.C.J.)

NEMETZ, C.J.B.C.: Madam Justice McLachlin will deliver the first judgment.

ORIGINAL

McLACHLIN, J.A.: This case involves a claim by the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia against the defendant, Darlene Clemmenson, its insured, for idemnity for settlement monies which the Insurance Corporation has paid to a Mr. Joseph, who was struck and injured by the motor vehicle driven by Darlene Clemmenson.

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The facts as found by the trial judge established that Miss Clemmenson had been drinking prior to the accident; an hour and forty minutes after the accident occurred, she gave breathalizer readings of .18 and .17.

In June 1980, some months after the accident, the injured person, Mr. Joseph, brought an action against Miss Clemmenson, with Mr. Stephen Wood acting as his solicitor.

In June of 1981 the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia filed a Third Party notice under s.20(7) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act, alleging that Miss Clemmenson was in breach of a condition of her insurance contract by driving while under the influence of alcohol.

Miss Clemmenson's solicitor, Mr. Jenkins, took out an appointment to examine Mr. Joseph for discovery on April 26, 1982. Mr. Joseph did not attend. On May 27, 1982, Mr. Jenkins obtained a Chamber order requiring Mr. Joseph's attendance for examination

for discovery, failing which Joseph's action would be dismissed.

Jean Ostanek was the adjuster employed by I.C.B.C. who dealt with Joseph's claim. She was aware of the existence of the Chamber order and had been told by Mr. Wood that he could not locate his client and wished to be removed from the record.

On June 25, 1982, Miss Ostanek made a settlement offer of \$8,000 to Mr. Wood on behalf of I.C.B.C. She left a draft for \$8,000 with Mr. Wood.

Miss Ostanek was aware that Mr. Wood was still having difficulty tracking down his client. Using the resources of the Insurance Corporation, she tracked down the whereabouts of Mr. Joseph on August 18, 1982. Prior to that time Mr. Joseph's last contact with anyone involved in the accident was on May 12, 1982.

Miss Ostanek's file indicates that on October 20th, 1982, she asked Mr. Wood to return I.C.B.C.'s draft in the amount of \$8,000.

On November 8th, 1982, Mr. Wood telephoned the Insurance Corporation advising that he had spoken with Mr. Joseph and asking whether the offer of settlement was still open. He was advised by another adjuster that it was and the settlement was concluded.

Ultimately, Mr. Joseph's claim was settled for \$8,000. In addition, I.C.B.C. paid \$1,288.73 to B.C. Hospital program pursuant to the Hospital Insurance Act.

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The trial judge found that the settlement was reasonable both as to liability and quantum. However, he dismissed I.C.B.C.'s claim against Miss Clemmenson for indemnity under s.20(6) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act. He found that I.C.B.C. had breached its duty to its insured in taking the steps it did to locate Mr. Joseph in the circumstances where Mr. Joseph's inactivity would likely have led to a dismissal of the action. He further found that it would have been in the best interest of Clemmenson for I.C.B.C. to have taken the position that the offer was no longer open on November 8, 1982, when Mr. Wood called, as it was likely, or possible at the very least, that Mr. Joseph's inconsistent interest in the claim would lead to dismissal of the action.

It appears from the transcript that Miss Clemmenson's solicitor was contacted prior to the final settlement and had knowledge of it. Indeed, on October 19 Mr. Jenkins, the solicitor for Miss Clemmenson, wrote to Mr. Wood, the solicitor for Mr. Joseph, asking:

"Would you please advise whether or not your client intends to accept the offer made to him by I.C.B.C."

Therefore, in my view, there can be no complaint that the ultimate offer of settlement was made without the concurrence of Miss Clemmenson.

Miss Clemmenson's counsel, however, argues before us that his client suffered prejudice by reason of the earlier conduct of I.C.B.C. in taking steps to trace Mr. Joseph and by failing to tell Miss Clemmenson or her counsel, Mr. Jenkins, that Mr. Joseph had disappeared from the scene and that Mr. Wood, Joseph's solicitor, was considering ceasing to act for him.

The argument, as I understand it, is that had I.C.B.C. imparted this information to Mr. Jenkins, the solicitor for Miss Clemmenson, in August of 1982, Mr. Jenkins, instead of, at the request of Mr. Wood, adjourning a discovery which was then scheduled of Mr. Joseph, would have insisted on proceeding and, Mr. Joseph not appearing, Mr. Jenkins would then have moved to have had the action struck out.

It is contended that I.C.B.C. acted unreasonably and acted in breach of its duty to its insured in failing to advise Miss Clemmenson of those facts of which it had knowledge at the time.

I find that I do not need to go into the issue for purposes of this case of whether I.C.B.C. acted unreasonably or

was in breach of any duty in failing to communicate the facts in question concerning Mr. Joseph's whereabouts and the possibility of Mr. Wood removing himself from the record. This is because I am satisfied that there is no evidence establishing that if there were such unreasonable conduct or breach of duty, the insured, Miss Clemmenson, was prejudiced thereby. Counsel for Miss Clemmenson concedes that there is no evidence of what was the state of Mr. Jenkins knowledge at the critical time when it was suggested he might have refused to adjourn the examination for discovery of Mr. Joseph and, upon Mr. Joseph's failure to attend, to strike out the action.

Mr. Jenkins did not testify. Miss Ostenak, the adjuster in charge of the case, admitted that she never advised Mr. Jenkins of the facts, but we do not know whether Mr. Jenkins learned of them from someone else, such as Mr. Wood, with whom he had a conversation before adjourning the discovery.

Furthermore, in the absence of Mr. Jenkins' testimony, there is no evidence of what he would have done had he known that Mr. Joseph was not in communication with his lawyer and had not been in communication with his lawyer for some time.

Now, the onus of establishing the state of Mr. Jenkins' knowledge and consequent prejudice to Miss Clemmenson arising from I.C.B.C.'s conduct is on Miss Clemmenson, the insured. In the

absence of any evidence establishing such prejudice, there is no causal link between the alleged breach of duty of the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia and the fact that a settlement was ultimately made as a result of which Miss Clemmenson finds herself faced with a claim to indemnify the Insurance Corporation.

In my view this is not a case where it is necessary to interfere with findings of fact of the trial judge. The matters I have referred to are inferences which flow from the facts, and in particular from the absence of certain critical evidence.

For these reasons I would allow the appeal.

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NEMETZ, C.J.B.C.: I agree.

HINKSON, J.A.: I agree.

NEMETZ, C.J.B.C.: The appeal is allowed.

B.M.M. J.A.